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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
The appellants, residents and property owners in Donora, 
Pennsylvania, brought this action against certain public 
officials and entities and private parties in the aftermath of 
the installation of public sewerage lines in Donora to which 
appellants were required to join their properties at 
considerable expense. While most of the appellants did not 
object to the installation of the sewerage lines, see 
appellants' br. at 8, they contend that they 
unconstitutionally were treated differently than certain 
other property owners and users of the sewerage system 
with respect to the need to join the system and the 
allocation of its costs. Id. Inasmuch as the appellants 
brought their action under the civil rights laws, 42 U.S.C. 
SS 1983 and 1985, and RICO, 18 U.S.C. S 1961, the district 
court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 
1343(a)(3). 
 
The district court, in a comprehensive memorandum 
opinion and an accompanying order dated August 23, 
1999, granted the appellees' motions to dismiss pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We have reviewed this case and 
have concluded that the appeal is clearly without merit and 
that a published opinion on the substantive issues raised 
on this appeal would have no institutional or precedential 
value. Consequently, we ordinarily would affirm the order of 
the district court with a memorandum opinion as provided 
in our Internal Operating Procedure 5.4. Nevertheless, in 
view of a jurisdictional issue which the appellees raise we 
do not do so. 
 
The district court's order of dismissal was entered on 
August 24, 1999. Therefore, the appellants had 30 days 
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from that time to file their notice of appeal, see Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(1), and thus the appeal, to be timely, should have 
been filed on or before September 23, 1999. Nevertheless, 
the appellants did not appeal within that time. Instead, on 
October 14, 1999, their attorney mailed to the appellees' 
attorneys a copy of a request to the district court for an 
extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal. 
The operative portions of the request for the extension of 
time read in full as follows: 
 
       1. The plaintiffs have notified counsel that the y wish to 
       appeal this Honorable Court's action of 23 August 
       1999 dismissing their complaint in the above captioned 
       matter.1 
 
       2. Counsel, whose civil practice invariably includ es the 
       United States as a party, informed them that they had 
       sixty (60) days to file a notice of appeal. 
 
       3. Believing that he had sixty (60) days within wh ich 
       the plaintiffs could take an appeal, counsel began a 
       rather lengthy motion for this Honorable Court to 
       reconsider its ruling. 
 
       4. From 23 August to the present counsel has tried 
       three jury trials, filed five trial court briefs and a brief 
       for the Commonwealth Court as well attending 
       hearings for twelve other clients. 
 
       5. On 13 August 1999 [sic], the daughter of one of the 
       plaintiffs whom I represent in this matter called to my 
       attention that the time for filing an appeal which her 
       mother wanted to do had passed and that I had 
       misinformed them as to the filing date. 
 
       6. I researched the matter and found that she was 
       right and that the appeal ought to have been filed upon 
       22 September 1999, rather than 22 October 1999 as I 
       had informed them which would have been the case 
       had the United States been a party. 
 
       7. Since the neglect was counsel's and I believe 
       excusable, the plaintiffs ought not to suffer from the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court's order was dated August 23, 1999, but was entered 
on the docket the following day. 
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       miscalculation of filing dates for the notice of appeal in 
       this matter. 
 
The appellants' attorney apparently submitted the 
request to the district court at about the same time that he 
mailed it to the appellees' attorneys because the court, on 
October 15, 1999, signed an order granting the appellants 
until November 1, 1999, to appeal. In fact, the appellants 
appealed on October 21, 1999. Subsequently, on December 
17, 1999, December 27, 1999, and December 29, 1999, the 
appellees moved in this court to quash the appeals and the 
appellants have responded to the motions to quash. 
 
We find the proceedings we describe above troublesome. 
Under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A), if a party shows"excusable 
neglect or good cause" the district court may extend the 
time for filing a notice of appeal if a motion seeking the 
extension is filed no later than 30 days after the expiration 
of the time prescribed for the appeal under Rule 4(a). Under 
Rule 4(a)(5)(B), such a motion may be ex parte  if filed before 
the expiration of the prescribed time unless the court 
requires otherwise. But a motion seeking an extension filed, 
as was the case here, after the expiration of the prescribed 
time must be on notice to the parties. Id. 
 
As a practical matter, the district court granted the order 
for the extension of time to appeal on an ex parte basis. As 
we have indicated, the appellants mailed the motion to 
appellees' attorneys on October 14, 1999. Accordingly, 
appellees did not have an opportunity to oppose the 
application for the extension of time because the court 
granted it on October 15, 1999, the same day they received 
the motion seeking the extension. 
 
Moreover, the order granting the extension was not 
consistent with the provisions of Rule 4(a)(5). That rule 
permits an extension which is not to exceed 30 days past 
the prescribed time for the appeal or 10 days from the date 
of entry of the order allowing the extension, whichever 
occurs later. In this case, a 30-day extension past the 
prescribed time for appeal would have established an 
appeal period ending on October 23, 1999, which by reason 
of Fed. R. App. P. 26(a) would have been extended to 
October 25, 1999, as October 23, 1999, was a Saturday. 
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Thus, the order granting the extension could have 
established an outside date for the appeal of ten days from 
October 15, 1999, or 32 days from September 23, 1999, 
i.e., to October 25, 1999. Notwithstanding the October 25, 
1999 limitation, the court extended the time until 
November 1, 1999. The appellants, as we have indicated, 
nevertheless filed their notice of appeal on October 21, 
1999, within a period that the court could have authorized 
under Rule 4(a)(5). 
 
We are concerned, however, with more than the 
procedural unfairness of the proceedings in the district 
court and the technical defect in the order of October 15, 
1999. According to the request for the extension of time to 
appeal submitted to the district court, the appellants' 
attorney, who indicates that his "civil practice invariably 
includes the United States as a party, informed[the 
appellants] that they had sixty (60) days tofile a notice of 
appeal." Moreover, believing that the appellants had 60 
days to appeal, "counsel began a rather lengthy motion for 
[the district court] to reconsider its ruling." The attorney 
indicates, however, that "[o]n 13 August 1999, the daughter 
of one of the plaintiffs whom I represent in this matter 
called to my attention that the time for filing an appeal 
which her mother wanted to do had passed and that I had 
misinformed them as to the filing date." It seems obvious to 
us that the attorney wrote "August" when he meant 
"October." He then indicated that he researched the matter 
and concluded that the appellant's daughter was correct. 
Finally, he asserts that his neglect was excusable and that 
his clients should not suffer from his miscalculations. 
 
This request for an extension did not establish"excusable 
neglect or good cause" for the court to grant the extension. 
While we recognize that issues arising under the Federal 
Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure are in some 
instances complex, Rule 4(a)(1), which establishes the time 
to appeal, is neither obscure nor difficult to understand. In 
fact, Rule 4(a)(1) specifies the time for appeal in cases in 
which the United States or an officer or agency thereof is or 
is not a party.2 In the circumstances, we cannot 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See also 28 U.S.C. S 2107. 
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understand how appellants' attorney could have been 
familiar with the 60-day provision when the United States 
or its officer or agency is a party but not the 30-day 
provision applicable in other cases. Moreover, surely it is 
not too much to ask that an attorney know the time for an 
appeal. See Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Larson, 827 
F.2d 916, 919 (3d Cir. 1987) (in determining whether there 
has been excusable neglect court should consider, inter 
alia, "whether the inadvertence reflects professional 
incompetence such as ignorance of the rules of procedure"); 
see also Ramseur v. Beyer, 921 F.2d 504, 506 (3d Cir. 
1990) (" `Rule 4(a)(5) . . . require(s) afinding of excusable 
neglect in those instances where the court, after weighing 
the relevant considerations, is satisfied that counsel has 
exhibited substantial diligence, professional competence 
and has acted in good faith to conform his or her conduct 
in accordance with the rule.' ") (quoting Consolidated 
Freightways). 
 
Furthermore, appellants' attorney, in reliance on his 
belief that he had 60 days to appeal, "began a rather 
lengthy motion for [the district court] to reconsider its 
ruling." This action demonstrates another 
misunderstanding of an applicable court rule, as motions 
for reconsideration must be filed within ten days of the 
entry of the judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e); Federal 
Kemper Ins. Co. v. Rauscher, 807 F.2d 345, 348 (3d Cir. 
1987) ("For purposes of Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, we view a motion characterized only 
as a motion for reconsideration as the `functional 
equivalent' of a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a 
judgment."). Thus, the time for appeal simply is not 
germane to the question of when a motion for 
reconsideration may be filed. 
 
We also point out that only a timely motion for 
reconsideration extends the time for an appeal. See Fed. R. 
App. P. 4(a)(4); Welch v. Folsom, 925 F.2d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 
1991) ("[A] Rule 59(e) motion does not toll the time for 
appeal, unless it is `timely filed.' "). Indeed, an untimely 
motion for reconsideration is "void and of no effect." United 
States v. Contents of Accounts Nos. 3034504504 and 144- 
07143, 971 F.2d 974, 976 n.1 (3d Cir. 1992). In fact, the 
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appellants' attorney filed a motion for reconsideration in the 
district court on October 20, 1999, and, as it was untimely, 
it did not extend the time for appeal. The district court 
denied the motion on October 22, 1999. 
 
It might be thought from the foregoing discussion that we 
should dismiss this appeal and, indeed, we are tempted to 
do so. But we will not dismiss the appeal because the 
appellees did not appeal from the order granting the 
extension of time to appeal. Moreover, we cannot treat their 
motions to quash as notices of appeal, as they filed the 
motions beyond the time to appeal from the order for the 
extension of the time to appeal. Furthermore, we are 
satisfied that the irregularities in the district court 
proceedings that we describe did not preclude the court 
from entering the order for the extension of time to appeal. 
Thus, this case differs from a situation in which the district 
court erroneously directs the entry of a final judgment 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) on fewer than all claims or 
parties in the case in an attempt to allow an appeal to be 
taken from an order even though it simply is notfinal. In 
that case, the court of appeals will not have jurisdiction. 
See Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363, 1368-71 (3d Cir. 
1994). Moreover, the appellants did appeal within a time 
that could have been allowed under Rule 4(a)(5), so we will 
not dismiss the appeal on the theory that the appeal could 
not have been timely as it was taken beyond any 
permissible extension period. 
 
Thus we are constrained to deny the appellees' motions 
to quash the appeal as we do have jurisdiction. While we 
deny the motions, we nevertheless emphasize that district 
courts, in considering applications for an extension of time 
to appeal which are filed after the expiration of the 
prescribed time to appeal, should not grant the request in 
the absence of an indication that the appellees do not 
object to the request without determining that the appellees 
have had an effective opportunity to object to the extension. 
Of course, even if the appellees do not object, the district 
court should not grant the extension absent a showing of 
excusable neglect or good cause as provided in Rule 4(a)(5). 
In this case, the appellants made no such showing. 
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In fact, inasmuch as it is evident that the notice to the 
appellees of the request for the extension effectively was no 
notice at all, we have considered remanding this matter to 
the district court so that it can reconsider the request for 
the extension on proper notice to the appellees. See Vianello 
v. Pacifico, 905 F.2d 699, 701 (3d Cir. 1990) (when district 
court erroneously concluded it could not extend the time 
for appeal court of appeals remanded case for further 
consideration). Nevertheless, though we could remand the 
matter for that purpose, we will not do so as we do have 
jurisdiction and we want to save the parties from further 
expense in this meritless litigation. 
 
In conclusion we determine that we have jurisdiction and 
thus we deny the motions to quash the appeal. But we also 
conclude that the appeal is completely without merit so we 
will affirm the order entered on August 24, 1999. 
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